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BEYOND STANDARD LEGAL POSITIVISM AND 
“AGGRESSIVE” NATURAL LAW: 
SOME THOUGHTS ON JUDGE O’SCANNLAIN’S 
“THIRD WAY” 
Michael Baur*
 
 
With his contribution on “The Natural Law in the American Tradition,”1
According to standard legal positivism, it is social facts or conventions 
alone (and not any moral principles) that constitute the fundamental criteria 
for determining what may count as valid law; for the standard legal 
positivist, then, there is no general requirement that positive law (or law as 
it is posited) must satisfy certain minimal moral norms in order to be valid 
as law.
 
Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain has begun the indispensable task of laying the 
groundwork for sound jurisprudential reasoning in the natural law tradition.  
It is on the basis of this groundwork that we can begin to appreciate what 
natural law reasoning might mean, and what it does not mean, for 
contemporary American legal thinking.  More specifically, it is on the basis 
of this groundwork that one can begin to articulate what might be called a 
“third way” of jurisprudential reasoning.  This “third way” would steer clear 
of two opposed and equally problematic jurisprudential views; that is, it 
would steer clear of what we might call “standard legal positivism” (on the 
one hand), and (on the other hand) what Judge O’Scannlain calls the 
“aggressive” natural law jurisprudence of some contemporary theorists. 
2
 
*  Adjunct Professor of Law, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University.  This 
paper was written in response to Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain’s remarks at Fordham 
University School of Law’s Natural Law Colloquium. 
  Thus the standard legal positivist holds that judges fulfill their 
 1. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1513 (2011). 
 2. Thus for H.L.A. Hart, the legal positivist endorses “the simple contention that it is in 
no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though 
in fact they have often done so.”  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185–86 (Penelope 
Bulloch & Joseph Raz, eds., 2d ed. 1994).  In other work, Hart has identified the legal 
positivist view as the view that there is no “necessary connection,” or that there is a 
“separation,” between law and morality.  See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).  More recently, Jules Coleman has preferred 
to discuss legal positivism in terms of a “separability thesis,” rather than a “separation 
thesis.”  For Coleman, “The separability thesis is the claim that there is no necessary 
connection between law and morality.  That claim does express a tenet of positivism.”  See 
JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE:  IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH 
TO LEGAL THEORY 104 n.4 (2001).  But note that some theorists who consider themselves 
legal positivists (we might call them non-standard legal positivists) have denied the 
“separability thesis.”  For an example of this “non-standard” version of legal positivism, see 
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legal duty as judges precisely by adhering to the law as it is simply posited 
(and thus as it is identifiable on the basis of morally-neutral social facts), 
and not by engaging in moral reasoning—beyond the positive law itself—
regarding what the law ought to be, or what the unwritten “natural law” 
might require.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, proponents of what 
Judge O’Scannlain calls “aggressive” natural law thinking hold that judges 
may—and indeed often must—render decisions concerning the positive law 
by looking beyond what the positive law itself provides and by discerning 
what is required as a matter of natural justice, or unwritten “natural law.”  
Thus, as Judge O’Scannlain observes, the “aggressive” natural law theorist 
holds that judges may on their own undertake to enforce or to actualize 
what they believe is required by the natural law, even if such enforcement 
or actualization is not itself mandated or authorized by existing positive law 
as such.3
In opposition to standard legal positivism and to aggressive natural law 
thinking, Judge O’Scannlain suggests a “third way”:  according to this 
“third way,” judges may not look beyond the positive law in order to 
enforce what, in their own minds, is required by the natural law; however, 
judges working within the American tradition may legitimately appeal to 
natural law moral principles in their legal decision-making, since this sort 
of appeal is consistent with strict reliance on the positive law itself insofar 
as natural law moral principles are built into—or embedded within—
American positive law itself.  This embedding of the natural law within 
American positive law—Judge O’Scannlain further argues—is evidenced 
by the fact that this country’s Founders were animated and informed by 
natural law principles as they deliberated about and eventually passed the 
positive law known as the United States Constitution. 
 
In the brief reflections that follow, I aim to do two things:  first, to offer 
independent confirmation of the fundamental correctness of the judge’s 
proposed “third way” between standard legal positivism and “aggressive” 
natural law; and second, to begin offering a conceptual clarification that 
might give further support to this third way.  I wish to achieve both of these 
tasks by reference to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, whose work is in 
some ways alien to contemporary American jurisprudence, but by no means 
alien to the natural law tradition as such. 
 
the work of Joseph Raz:  “The separability thesis is . . . implausible . . . . [I]t is very likely 
that there is some necessary connection between law and morality, that every legal system in 
force has some moral merit or does some moral good even if it is also the cause of a great 
deal of moral evil.” JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY 
OF LAW AND POLITICS 211 (1994). 
 3. For Judge O’Scannlain, the work of Hadley Arkes qualifies as an example of 
“aggressive” natural law theorizing.  Hadley Arkes claims, for example, that “[T]he task of 
judgment, in our constitutional law, persistently moves us away from the text, or from a 
gross description of the act [being judged], and it moves us to the commonsense 
understanding of the principles that guide these judgments:  the principles that help us in 
making those distinctions between the things that are justified or unjustified.” HADLEY 
ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING TRUTHS 6 (2010). 
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For Aquinas, to understand what we mean by the term, “law,” is to 
understand that it is an ordering of reason (a rationis ordinatio, or a rational 
ordering) for the sake of the common good of some community, emanating 
from one who has care of the community, and promulgated.4  Notice that, 
for Aquinas, law—properly understood—is laid down not by just any 
person or any agent that possesses reason or that has good ideas, but rather 
by the one whose job it is to care for the community.5
But if one reads Aquinas with due care, it is evident that, on Aquinas’s 
view, there is a strict limitation on the power of judges to engage in their 
own acts of enforcing what is required by the natural law, if such acts of 
enforcement would amount to acts of unauthorized law-making.  We can 
say, then, Aquinas’s own theory of natural law contains within itself a 
certain kind of qualified legal positivism:  judges, if they have not been 
given legislative authority by the law that delineates the nature and scope of 
their offices in the first place, may not “legislate from the bench.”  Stated a 
bit differently, we might say that it is a violation of the natural law itself if a 
judge makes decisions by applying his or her own personal understanding 
of what the natural law requires, if such an application is not permitted by 
the law which gives the judge his or her authority to decide cases in the first 
place.
  For Aquinas, an 
essential feature of the law as such is that it emanates from one (whether 
this be an individual or group) that possesses the proper authority to look 
after the common good of the community in question.  From this, there 
follows an important implication regarding the question of whether judges 
as such may engage in acts of legislation (or, to express the manner in an 
idiom commonly used by many contemporary observers, whether they may 
“legislate from the bench”).  For Aquinas, because it is essential to the 
nature of law as such that it emanate from an agent or agents who have 
proper authority, it follows that judges who as such are not authorized to 
make the law (i.e., judges whose offices are not defined as law-making 
offices) may not legitimately engage in acts of legislation.  Some 
contemporary natural law thinkers have made the mistake of presenting 
Aquinas’s thought as if it were the thought of an “aggressive” natural law 
theorist. 
6
 
 4. For this famous and now almost-canonical definition of law, see ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, Q. 90, art. 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province trans., 1915) (1265–1274). 
 
 5. Thus Aquinas explicitly declares that it is not just anyone’s reason (ratio cuiuslibet), 
but rather the reason of one who has care of the community, that is competent to make law.  
See AQUINAS, supra note 4, at I-II, Q. 90, art. 3. 
 6. Robert George has helpfully pointed out that, for many legal theorists, “belief in 
natural law entails the authority of judges to enforce it when they judge it to be in conflict 
with positive law . . . .”  Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory 
and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2279–80 (2001).  But as George 
goes on to observe, this view—though common among both supporters and detractors of 
natural law reasoning—is a mistaken one.  For it is a mistake to suppose that believers in 
natural law will, or necessarily should, embrace expansive judicial review or even ‘natural 
law’ jurisprudence . . . .  And that is because questions of the existence and content of natural 
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Aquinas was quite clear about the requirement that acts of law-making, if 
they are to be legitimate, must emanate from the one (whether an individual 
or a group) that has proper authority to make the law.  This requirement is 
helpfully illustrated in a section of Aquinas’s Summa Theologica having to 
do with the killing of the innocent.  In that section, Aquinas asks whether a 
judge in a capital case may sentence a defendant that he—as judge— 
knows, based on private or personal information alone, to be innocent.  
Aquinas’s answer is revealing.  He says that a judge may sometimes be 
obligated to pronounce a sentence that he personally knows to be an unjust 
one.  The reason for this is that the judge, insofar as he exercises public 
authority, is obligated to render judgments on behalf of the community and 
for the sake of the community’s common good; accordingly, the judge may 
legitimately render judgments based only on knowledge acquired by him as 
a public authority, and not based on knowledge acquired by him as a private 
individual (i.e., outside the scope of an appropriate public, judicial process).  
If the judge in a capital case privately knows that a defendant is innocent, 
but is unable to remove himself from the case and is unable to bring his 
privately-acquired knowledge to light through some appropriate judicial 
proceeding, then the judge does no wrong—says Aquinas—in sentencing 
the innocent defendant to death.7
So much for my brief attempt (following Thomas Aquinas) to offer some 
independent support of Judge O’Scannlain’s suggested “third way” between 
standard legal positivism and “aggressive” natural law theorizing.  I turn 
now to what I regard as the harder task, namely the task of providing the 
beginnings of a conceptual clarification that might serve to provide further 
justification for Judge O’Scannlain’s jurisprudential position.  In 
articulating his position, Judge O’Scannlain referred, for illustrative 
purposes, to the relatively recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
case of District of Columbia v. Heller.
  The judge would be doing wrong, 
however, if he were to rely materially on his own privately-held knowledge 
or beliefs, in order to render what in essence is a public and not a private 
decision. 
8
Of relevance for Judge O’Scannlain is the fact that, in Heller, the 
Supreme Court explained its reasoning and decision making by launching 
into an extended discussion of how the “natural right” to bear arms was 
understood in American history before and during the time of the Framers’ 
enactment of the U.S. Constitution.
 
9
 
law and natural rights are, as a logical matter, independent of questions of institutional 
authority to give practical effect to natural law and to protect natural rights. 
  For the purpose of my analysis here, I 
shall refrain from commenting on the merits of the Heller decision as such.  
I wish instead to address what I regard as a deeper jurisprudential issue; and 
in order to address that issue, it will be most helpful if I simply stipulate—
Id. at 2279–80. 
 7. See AQUINAS, supra note 4, at II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, ad. 3; for other passages relevant to 
this topic, see also id. at II-II, Q. 67, art. 2 & II-II, Q. 96, art. 6. 
 8. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 9. O’Scannlain, supra note 1, at 1523–26. 
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for the sake of the present analysis—that the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
and decision-making in Heller were correct. 
But now to my question:  assuming that the Supreme Court decided 
correctly in Heller, was the decision correct on account of the fact that there 
really does exist, as a matter of objectively valid “natural law,” a genuine 
“natural right” to bear arms?  Or rather, was the Supreme Court correct in 
Heller on account of the fact that the law-makers who framed the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were animated by the understanding that 
there was such a natural right, even if—as a matter of objectively valid 
“natural law”—the Framers may have been wrong in understanding or 
believing this? 
Before saying a bit more about why I regard these questions as important, 
I would like to make a brief observation about why, in my view, Judge 
O’Scannlain is right to suggest that the understandings which animate the 
legislator’s acts of law-making are relevant to a judge’s interpretation and 
application of the law.  The reason is that such understandings reveal what 
the law itself actually is.  In other words, the understandings that animate 
the legislator’s acts of law-making are not of merely historical or 
biographical interest; they are not just add-ons; they are not merely 
tangential considerations which in themselves are extraneous to the correct 
determination of what the law itself is.  Rather, the understandings that 
animate acts of legislation belong to the rational principles which define 
and determine what the law itself is, since—as Aquinas affirms—the law is 
nothing other than an ordering of reason; and an ordering of reason, to be an 
ordering of reason at all, must be determined or guided by some animating 
rational principle or act of understanding. 
By way of analogy, we might observe that the intention that animates an 
agent’s action is not merely tangential or extraneous to the correct 
determination of what the agent’s action is; the intention is not something 
added on to the action.  Rather, the intention is the animating principle 
which plays a key role in defining just what the action is in the first place.  
Hence, it is intention which formally defines an act of murder and makes it 
an act that is different in kind from the act of, say, involuntary 
manslaughter. 
But now back to my questions, slightly reformulated:  was the Heller 
Court correct since it correctly discerned that there really does exist, as a 
matter of objectively valid “natural law,” a “natural right” to bear arms?  Or 
rather, was the Heller Court correct since it correctly discerned that the law-
makers who framed the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were animated 
by the understanding that there is such a “natural right,” even if the Framers 
may have been mistaken about this?  If I have rightly understood the 
position that he puts forward, Judge O’Scannlain should be deeply resistant 
to the binary choice that I am presenting here.  For if Judge O’Scannlain 
were to opt for the first answer (that the Heller Court was correct since it 
correctly discerned that there really does exist, as a matter of objectively 
valid “natural law,” a “natural right” to bear arms), then he would be in 
danger of endorsing a version of “aggressive” natural law thinking, 
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according to which judges may undertake to enforce or to actualize what, 
according to their own understanding, is required by an objectively valid 
natural law.  But if Judge O’Scannlain were to opt for the second answer 
(that the Heller Court was correct since it correctly discerned that the law-
makers who framed the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were animated 
by the understanding that there is such a “natural right,” even if the Framers 
may have been mistaken about this), then his position is in danger of 
collapsing into a version of legal positivism.  For if the Heller Court was 
correct simply on account of the fact that it correctly discerned the actual 
understandings that animated the Framers in their acts of law-making, then 
the correctness of the Court’s reasoning would be determined on the basis 
of historical facts alone and not by reference to any moral considerations 
regarding what is required by the “natural law” as such. 
Now if I have understood his position correctly, Judge O’Scannlain 
would want to say that the Heller Court was correct since it correctly 
discerned the actual understandings of the Framers, and also correctly 
discerned that there really does exist, as a matter of objectively valid natural 
law, a “natural right” to bear arms.  But that answer—as correct as it may 
be—does not address the fundamental problem of principle that I wish to 
raise.  What if the Heller Court correctly discerned that the Framers were 
animated by the understanding that there is a “natural right” to bear arms, 
and yet the Framers were nevertheless mistaken about this supposed right?  
In order to suggest a possible answer to this question, I would like to turn 
once again to the thought of Thomas Aquinas.  Aquinas—so far as I 
understand his “natural law” jurisprudence—would say that the Heller 
Court was correct in its decision on account of the fact that the Court 
correctly discerned that the Framers understood that there is a “natural 
right” to bear arms, and the Heller Court would still be correct in this 
decision, even if it were the case that the Framers were mistaken about this 
“natural right,” provided that the Framers’ being mistaken about this 
philosophical or anthropological issue did not lead them to make the 
mistake of enacting positive laws that were fatally defective precisely as 
laws.  A positive law might be fatally defective precisely as a law, if—for 
instance—it emanated from someone who lacked the proper authority to 
enact it; or if it was not properly promulgated (e.g., if it was promulgated 
only ex post facto); or if it required citizens to do that which is 
contradictory or otherwise impossible. 
For Aquinas, properly authorized law-makers might very well enact 
positive laws that are animated by mistaken philosophical or 
anthropological views.  But even if law-makers are motivated by incorrect 
philosophical or anthropological views, it does not follow that the laws 
which are enacted on the basis of such views are thereby invalid as laws.  
Indeed, unless judges have been given the authority to enforce their own 
philosophical or anthropological views, they are—on Aquinas’s view—in 
danger of acting outside the scope of proper authority (and thus acting 
illicitly) if they take it upon themselves (a) to strike down properly posited 
laws on the grounds that such laws reflect some incorrect philosophical or 
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anthropological perspective, or (b) to enforce unposited laws on the grounds 
that such enforcement is mandated by the judge’s “more correct” 
philosophical or anthropological perspective. 
For Aquinas, defectiveness in the legislator’s philosophical or 
anthropological views does not necessarily entail defectiveness as a matter 
of legal validity.  Imagine a scenario in which a legislator—animated by a 
mistaken philosophical or anthropological view—passes laws that legalize 
and regulate prostitution.  In passing such laws, the legislator (again, 
whether an individual or a group) may believe (based on what for Aquinas 
would be a mistaken view) that prostitution is neither morally good nor 
morally evil, but morally neutral; or the legislator may believe (again, based 
on what for Aquinas would be a mistaken view) that the question of 
prostitution’s morality is altogether undecidable, since it is impossible to 
make objectively valid moral judgments about anything whatsoever.  Now 
Aquinas himself would regard prostitution as morally objectionable—
indeed, he would regard it as intrinsically evil insofar as it is an instance of 
fornication10—but he would nevertheless say that properly enacted laws 
which legalize and regulate prostitution (even if those law are motivated by 
incorrect philosophical or anthropological views) may be perfectly valid as 
law.  Indeed, Aquinas argues explicitly in favor of the legal permission of 
prostitution; but unlike arguments which focus on the alleged neutrality or 
undecidability of prostitution’s moral status, Aquinas’s argument for the 
legal permission of prostitution depends on an affirmative moral judgment 
regarding the common good.  Even if prostitution in itself is morally illicit, 
so Aquinas argues, the legal prohibition of prostitution would bring about 
greater harm than benefit to the common good (this is because, for Aquinas, 
the legal prohibition of prostitution would induce many men to satisfy their 
inordinate desires by resorting to behaviors that would bring about more 
egregious forms of damage and disorder to the community as a whole).11
The point here is that, on Aquinas’s view, widely divergent philosophical 
or anthropological views (some correct and some incorrect) may 
independently lead to the same, perfectly correct conclusions regarding the 
kinds of laws that ought to be passed for a particular community.  Stated 
more provocatively:  for Aquinas, the passage of perfectly valid laws (and 
even perfectly beneficial laws) may be informed and motivated by 
adherence to perfectly incorrect philosophical or anthropological beliefs.  In 
the face of such laws, the proper role of the judge as judge is to assess not 
the soundness of the legislator’s philosophical or anthropological views, but 
rather the legal validity of the legislator’s acts of law-making.  Even though 
(as we have seen above) the judge must attend to the legislator’s acts of 
understanding in order to discern what the law itself is, it nevertheless 
remains the case that the judge as such is authorized to criticize the 
  
Since the aim of law is the common good and not just individual goods—so 
Aquinas argues—it would be unwise to pass laws that prohibit prostitution. 
 
 10. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, DE MALO, Q. 15, art. 1-3. 
 11. AQUINAS, supra note 4, at II-II, Q. 10, art. 11; see also ST. AUGUSTINE, DE ORDINE, 
II, 4. 
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legislator for being a bad legislator, but not for being a bad philosopher or 
bad anthropologist. 
Now might there be some alternative scenario in which the legislator’s 
being mistaken about some given philosophical or anthropological issue 
does, in fact, lead the legislator to enact positive laws that are fatally 
defective precisely as laws?  In other words, might there be some 
alternative scenario in which the legislator’s being a bad philosopher or a 
bad anthropologist does indeed cause the legislator to be a bad legislator as 
well?  Of course.  Consider a utilitarian-motivated theory of punishment 
according to which the central purpose of punishment is not to achieve 
retribution with respect to some individual wrong-doer, but rather to deter 
the citizenry in general from engaging in socially-offensive conduct.  
Animated by this theoretical view of the purpose of punishment (one that 
Aquinas would regard as incorrect), a utilitarian legislator may pass 
criminal laws which are to be enforced ex post facto, perhaps based on the 
belief that the ex post facto enforcement of such laws will lead to increased 
general deterrence and thus bring about the “greatest good for the greatest 
number.”  In a scenario such as this, Aquinas would hold, the legislator’s 
philosophical or anthropological views do lead the legislator to pass 
positive laws that are fatally defective precisely as laws.  But again, it is not 
the defectiveness of the philosophical or anthropological views as such—
but rather the defectiveness of the legislative enactments engendered by 
such views—that fall within the scope of the judge’s proper authority to 
evaluate and criticize. 
According to Aquinas’s “natural law” judicial philosophy, a judge 
(unless given the special authority to enforce his or her own particular 
philosophical or anthropological views about things) should aim not to 
correct legislatures for being defective philosophers or defective 
anthropologists, but rather for passing positive laws that are fatally 
defective as laws.  As noted above, there are many ways in which a positive 
law might be fatally defective as a law:  for example, a positive law may 
have been enacted without the proper authority; or it may not have been 
properly promulgated; or it may require citizens to do that which is 
contradictory or otherwise impossible.  But now we might ask:  on what 
basis does a judge know that these are among the various ways in which a 
positive law might be fatally defective as law?  There simply are no general 
provisions in the United States Constitution which explain to American 
judges how positive laws ought to be tested in terms of authoritativeness, 
promulgation, or coherence.  In holding that judges may legitimately 
criticize positive laws on the basis of these criteria—even though these 
criteria are not spelled out in the Constitution itself—are we not (as Hadley 
Arkes says we are) moving “away from the text”12
 
 12. ARKES, supra note 3, at 6. 
 of the Constitution itself 
and thus relying on a kind of unwritten “natural law”?  And if so, are we not 
guilty of engaging in the sort of “aggressive” natural law theorizing that 
Judge O’Scannlain has so forcefully questioned? 
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My response to these important and difficult questions cannot be fully 
justified within the present context.  But I hope that the following, 
exceedingly brief response (based on Aquinas’s jurisprudence) will be 
more-or-less on the mark, and might perhaps suggest some avenues for 
further dialogue on the topic.  It is true enough that the United States 
Constitution—itself an instance of positive law—does not explicitly 
enumerate the many different normative grounds upon which a judge may 
legitimately criticize instances of positive law.  But it does not follow from 
this that a judge must “move away” from what is given through the positive 
law in order to understand and appreciate such normative grounds.  
Consider:  the United States Constitution—in the midst of all the things that 
it does explicitly enumerate—also presents itself as an instance of what is 
meant by “law.”  In presenting itself as an instance of “law,” the 
Constitution does not justify its status as an instance of law; it does not 
explain what is meant by “law”; and it does not spell out criteria that must 
be met if a particular enactment is to be regarded as valid law.  If the United 
States Constitution does not provide such justification, explanation, or 
criteria, then how are American judges supposed to be guided in their 
understanding of what is meant by “law” and in their assessment of the 
legal soundness or defectiveness of particular positive laws? 
It is tempting to think that the requisite justification, explanation, or 
criteria must be made available (assuming that they are available at all) 
either (a) through the sheer fact of some particular act of positing (e.g., 
through some existing “convention” or “social fact”) that the judge happens 
to accept or endorse as directive or normatively significant for his or her 
decision-making, or (b) through the judge’s own “natural law” moral 
reasoning which—precisely because it is the judge’s own, independent 
moral reasoning—allows the judge to take a critical stance with respect to 
all merely posited “conventions” and “social facts.”  If one is tempted by 
the first option, then one is likely to be attracted to some form of legal 
positivism; if one is tempted by the second option, then one is likely to be 
attracted to some form of “aggressive” natural law thinking.  But Aquinas 
would hold that this binary choice between two mutually exclusive options 
represents a well-disguised false dichotomy. 
For Aquinas, it is never the case that the various positings of human 
beings are mere “social facts” which in themselves are devoid of intrinsic 
goodness and which acquire value or normative significance only through 
some extraneous, supervenient act of acceptance or endorsement by an 
observing agent (e.g., a judge) who happens to regard the “mere facts” as 
directive or normatively significant for him or her.  Rather, all human 
activity as such—including the activity of positing even the most 
incomplete, imperfect, or defective instances of law—is always and 
inescapably informed by rational, goal-directed norms, and thus is never 
accurately characterizable as a mere “convention” or “social fact” devoid of 
all intrinsic goodness.  Conversely, it is never the case that the norms on the 
basis of which judges (or we) may legitimately evaluate existing positive 
laws, can be given apart from the actual and concrete practices, interactions, 
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and patterns of behavior (in short, the positings) that inform us and make us 
the social, linguistic, concept-wielding, and hence rational beings that we 
are.  Accordingly, the term “natural law” is not best understood as referring 
to some kind of invisible, ideal, transcendental, unposited, or unexpressed 
kind of law or set of norms residing in some Platonic heaven above us; the 
term refers rather to the distinctive and immanently rational manner in 
which we, as goal-directed beings, inescapably (even if imperfectly) 
institute or posit various kinds of order, both in our own lives and in the 
things that surround us, for the sake of achieving what we apprehend as 
intelligible goods in our real (non-Platonic) world here and now. 
Aquinas gives expression to this same point when he maintains that 
“human law” (or what we have been calling “positive law”) is not 
something that exists independent of and separate from “natural law,” just 
as “natural law” is not something that exists independent of and separate 
from “eternal law.”13
For present purposes, the key implication of the foregoing observations is 
that—on Aquinas’s view—American judges who properly criticize positive 
laws on the basis of “natural law” principles, do not do so by holding 
positive laws up to some external model or standard (known as “natural 
law”), and then discerning whether there is a match or mismatch between 
the two entities (“positive law” and “natural law”).  As we have seen, 
positive law (or human law) for Aquinas is not something that exists 
independent of and separate from “natural law,” but is rather a specification 
or particularized instantiation of the natural law.  Because of this, positive 
laws (or human laws) which are properly judged to be defective in light of 
natural law (or even eternal law) are not laws that have been compared to, 
and found wanting in accordance with, an external, transcendental standard; 
rather, they are laws which happen to harbor within themselves some 
immanent or internal defect.  “Natural law” judges, therefore, do not need 
  For Aquinas, “natural law” is simply “eternal law” 
but apprehended precisely under the aspect of its (eternal law’s) being in us 
as rational beings that are both (a) ordered to the common good of the 
universe, and also (b) capable of rationally ordering ourselves and other 
things towards that very same common good of the universe.  By the same 
token, on Aquinas’s account, “human law” is simply “natural law” but 
apprehended precisely under the aspect of its (natural law’s) being in us as 
beings that are not only (a) capable of rationally ordering ourselves and 
other things towards the common good of the universe, but also (b) capable 
of ordering other human beings to a more limited common good, namely, 
the common good of a particular and uniquely situated political community.  
(Notice:  since natural law and human law do not exist in addition to or in 
opposition to eternal law, it follows—for Aquinas—that the limited 
common good that is the object of human law—i.e., the common good of a 
political community—is not pursued in addition to or in opposition to the 
common good of the universe, but rather as a part of the common good of 
the universe.) 
 
 13. AQUINAS, supra note 4, at I-II, Q. 91, art. 2, ad. 1. 
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to appeal to an external, transcendental standard, or “move beyond” what is 
given in the positive law.  What they need to do, rather, is attend carefully 
to what is given in the positive law itself in order to discern whether there is 
some lack of due order or intelligibility which immanently renders the law 
fatally defective precisely as the law that it is (or claims to be).  But this is 
just another way of suggesting that the proper activity of “natural law” 
judges working in the American tradition is adequately explained neither by 
standard legal positivism nor by “aggressive” natural law; and following 
Aquinas, the best way to move beyond these two opposed schools of 
jurisprudential thought is to question the well-disguised false dichotomy 
that they both seem to endorse. 
 
